V I B 


Author 



Title 


Class 

Book _ 


Imprint.. 


M—4aZ72-l 0^0 


. /a 


FT MEADE 
GenCol1 


/ 




























"V' 





i-OuL^ 




CLASSIIIOaIXON 

CPPIJb OF STRATE.GI3 SERVICES riAGSiFlCATiOii 

Changed to 

UN^lESTRICTED Research and Analysis Branch chfrnged to 

RKiaiCTEO 

wruMaT/lva^J! 

Chief, R&A Branch 




R & A No. 1091 


byrp^ 

Date /f^y 

TPIE GERPIAN E'AR ECONOMY, 1918 AND 1943; 


A COMPARISON 
(Expanded) 




5 October 194; 


A Gorjiparison of the position of Germany 
vis-a-vis her opponents in the spring of 
1918 v/ith that in the summer and autumn 
of 1943. Civilian welfare and efficiency^ 
industrial production, military supply^ 
and military manpower are dealt with. 


If and when this study outlives its 
usefulness to you, kindly return it to; 

Office of Strategic Services 
Director, Research and Analysis Branch 
85th and E Streets, N. ’.V. 

V/ashington, D. C. 


COPY No. 139 












I 


ff 


I' 







I 




. J 



4 










'".V 

V<r'v‘ 

v.‘.> 

( -^T 


» 




•5 W 
' • o 


* 

I 




» 


d 




L hi a I ^m\iL 






o 


This document contains information 
affecting the national defense of the United 
States within the meaning of the Espionage 
act, 50 U.S.C., 31 32 as amended. Its 

transmission or the revelation of its con¬ 
tents in any manner to an unauthorized person 
is prohibited by law. 



^ W O \ 






*^1Br*f 





u;' 



• L'^. 

, ‘ to’f^‘f< ‘ * ** 

./’^ •^' , .1 ‘ivi" ’ ‘ . » * ■?,.,». ^ > 



. ' V' 

'*i» • 

'.?V' I 


“w.' . 

■ 


y 


>•1 


Vi< 


^ -fcii 




• \ 

♦ ■ / 




>t 




-..-i a iiji 


C'. 



.'» 


■ - . 
• t » ■ ■ kt 

, .> • *■ 

1 « 

A • r V » , 


t Ft 


r J 




,» ^ 


^" ;i’ i •.;; ■ t. ,%.vr -t -■ • 

j v' ,’ V--(U- VfiV' .'■ . ' I ‘ '^,^}*' ^»- , 


1' 


•« 







> - 


1 ^ . . 's 

f N 


M,- 


'f 


’ K' 


• i: 




,|-'T V. 1 ,,t, I, ' V 

■■ *'■. *J?v -VA ' 1 :. 

'*■*'■''*'‘1 4/ :tv'■ , '• 


iT- 




■ ■* ■ ‘V Mv -/ 


\*i 


'•it '/* 
^ 1/ 


st''’'' - • 




t 


; '7 


m 

fy%: 

\{.f 

■• ' V ' S 

' ■■' ri; 'VkJ 

r i\V?A,V ■ 

* I , •»■ jl Jv I • ' 



- tv 

' •■ ■. fc ' •■* 

T‘ I ’ 


• » 
r; 


>• k 

* 4 


r. 


\ ’ 


V;. 


■ ,i» ^ 




> ^ i .* / •’ , . 


> t 


» » 


t’. f 4* 6 

• ^ 0> •! V i 


rN J'' 




s 


A* , 


k,j Y 


■■. » !' 'n 



l.l . 






t' »• »*• 




rH «♦ » 


» / 


t*- 
I ^ 


j • 


><> 


Mb j 




* 


'>A 

I / 


- v* * 




'Mi 

• * •t 


V ) • 4i I 


» - 1 V f 




,f * 

W r . ■• » 

Mi 


•I 

> •. 


■ f -r.-, . 

4 I 


• i 

V. 


ii .'J**^.- ■ 





l/i' ''Ati • I. < 4.V4^ , /■* ‘ > « 11 • 

”* /V v'‘'‘''.''-'^ir '\' 



^-r". 

i .U jT 


*•1, 

1 _ 


. f 


■ N 


ii.. 


t > 

wvr 




';,: ' '' 

i f-' 



: 


Mf ji\ iti 


A 1 i .i d 1 


SECRET 


TABLE OF CONTENTS 


Sunrnary 


I. INTRODUCTION 

,11. CIVILIAN TiVELFARE 

A. Germany: General 

B. The German Food Situation, I 9 IQ and 

19il3 

C. German Civilian Health and Efficiency, 

1918 and I 9 I 13 

D. Conditions among Germany’s Opponents 

III. INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES AND PRODUCTION 

A. General 

B. The Industrial Output of the Belligerent, 

19 lil~ 19 l 8 

C. Gorman Shortages of Strategic Materials, I 9 I 8 

D. The German Position, 19^-3 

E. Comparison with the -Allied Position, 191-1-3 

IV. MILITARY SUPPLIES 

A. General 

3. Comparative Production of Materiel, 
h'orld War I 

C. Comparative Production of Materiel, 

World War II 

V. MILITARY M/J'3P0V.ER 

A. General 

B. Comparative Military Manpower, Y/orld War I 

C. Comparative Military Manpower, World War II 

VI. CONCLUSION 




* 


I 


I 





r 



s 




-I 

4 


’ r 


V 


r 


i 


S \ 


\ 




\ 



. • A 


*■ ’■ % * ' V 

. i ^ ' 


V, 


V 




»« 


^ } 

s 


tf 


t 


i 


i 


/ 


t 


« 





t 


y 



ft 






1 


1 


SECRET 


u LI . 1 : ARY 


1. This paper r:id.-:es a detailed conpa.rison of the 

situations in 1918 and 1943 to see v;hat lessons nap bo 

drav/n from the parallels and from the contrasts. 

\ 

2. an .1913 foo.., clothinr;, and fuel were scarce 

in Germany. The daily food ration in Berlin provided for 
only 1600 calories, less than two-thirds of requirements. 
The average weight of the urban_ adult population declined 
by more than 20 percent. In 1943, the agricultural lands 
available are greater, and prod.uction of syntlietic fibers 
has prevented any drastic shortage of clothing. Food 
rations are in general adeoguato in vitamin content. 
thetic vitamins arc widely available. Except for deaths 
due to epidemic diseases, death rates have risen far less 
than in 1910. 

Russia, , Germany»s laain opponent in 1943, suffers 
mucii grjater lach of food tlian did Franco and Englaiad 
in 1913. 

3. By 1913 Germany had ali'.iost ciLliaustcd her sup¬ 
plies of te::tile5, v;as short of rubber, and vras desporatch 
short of oil. The production of s^^natlietics, plus stoch- 
piling and exploitation of occupied areas, have prevented 
sir-iilar shortages from arising in 1945. Gorman output of 
metals, minerals, and chemicals held up v/ell from 1914 to 
191.3, though lior total industrial output declined more 
than that of England, French production fell sharply. 




o 

Cj 


SECIGT 


3y 1918, Ar.ioricaii dlvorsion of her productive capacity to 
v/ar uses, pluc access by the Allies to v/orld rosoia’ces, 
gave the Allios a definite and incroasing indtistrial ad¬ 
vantage ovor CTornomy. 

The TJnitod nations in 1943 are enjoying a v/idening 
margin of industrial superiority v/hich is gredtor tlrin 
was the margin of the Allies in 1913. ITov/ as tiicn tlic 
circijmstance vfjcich is giving •G-orr.iany' s cnonies a growing 
advantage is not the gra.dual dcvolopiicnt by th^m of grcD.ter 
total industrial output but primarily the diversion to w^ar 
production of an increasing proportion of an industrial 
productive capacity r/hich has a.lv;ays been superior to that 
undor CTcrmany ’ s control. For i:.ncmipl^, total Axis 1942 pro- 
duc t i o n of steel is so me 43,000,000 i;lg o b me trie t on s ; 
tha.t of the United hations 120,000,000 tons. Ililitary 
cons’cmption of steel in tlie United States in the last 
quarter of 1941 \'/a.s at the annua.l rate of 18.4 million 
tons, one-fifth of total United States supply. A year 


latu. 

r in the 

United State 

o 

a Ion;., it v^as 

at tjie annual 

rate 

of 49..2 

million tons 

9 

over one-half 

of total supply y 

an CL 

greater i 

-'j.ii-A.n L/iivj uooa 

n 

J, 

output of th^ 

European Axis 

plus 

J apan. 






4. As 

a- result of 

i— 

Ul.., 

.is industrial 

a. dV .an t ag o, t he 


enemies of C-fermany gained c; cleiir advantage in v/eiglit of 
armament before the L.nd of each i/ar. In noitlicr ease did 
enotc inadequately oepaipped German units; the a.d- 


t'iiis d-'"^'-'^'■'i 


vantage in munitions was paralleled h 


superiority of 


o 


SECRET 


nLii'ibors . G-or man munitions output in ore as od, up to and 
includlnf; 1918; but Allied output increased more. Bri¬ 
tish plus Aivicrics.n pi^oduction of machine runs v/as 16 

times as r^rcat in 1918 as in 1917. At th^-. Armistice, the 
— • 

Allies had 5972 *’battlc planes'* on the 'western front; 
Germany hs.d 2730. The Allies were also (;;roatly superior 
in tanks, because of failure of the G-erms.n hir;h comaiand 
to appreciate the value of tanlis in time to (^ct production . 
under v/av* 

• In 1943, tlic aarpin of United Uations superiority 

* 

in munitions is probably (greater, and is incP'^asinr: more 
rapidly than was the case in 1916. The; 'Is.tter is true 
essentially^ bcca.usc U. S. production is now at a stare 
corresponding to that, anticipated in 1918 for .1919,. British 
Empire and American output and esti.aated G^rsian output i?.i 
the la.st quarter of 1942 are: combat aircraft, 13,200 card 
4,800; field piecus, 5,730 said 2,055; machine puns 327,000 
and 38,0'00. To British-Ai.iwrican totals should bo added 
Russian production figures. 

G-ermany’s milits.ry production can hardly be greater, 
now than in 1942, and may be loss -- though her production 
of submarines and fighter a.ircrs.ft has increased signifi¬ 
cantly. Every category of British-Amorican production 
rose more than 50 percent from the 1942 average to the 
second q_uartcr of 1943 except gun ammunition, of which 
thure is a surplus. Output of heavy bombers in the second 
quarter of 1943 was 283 percent of the 1942 averagL; of 



fir^htcrs, 244 percent; of combat vehicles and. self- 


*% t ft 


rtille 

‘mr 

tf 

,s c.re 

S C 

, when 

it 

< 

cs;.sily 

■ 0 

<f 1 

• -1 •- o 

• ju O kw 

e c, 


t aipainst Gorrian stocks as -s. ps^rtial 
offset, s.nd Y/lien it is realised that current Russian 
production easily off sets "U. diversion to the Paci¬ 

fic theater.'It seems clc3.r, even allov/iny for supply 
routes uhich must be filled, that the United ITations ho.ve 
built uu a surericritv in equipment which is ra. idly in- 

.u (. -i. i. V 

creasiny, 

5, The superiority in equipment is paralleled, 
as in 1918, by superiority in military ms^npower, 
out the war of 1914-1913, the armiv..s of Germany .and 'Scr 
associates foil short of 12,000,000 men, while from the 
period of full mobilization luitil the collapse of Russia 
and Rirmania, the opposiny forcos e/cro e,000,000 or more 
greater. On the western front, th.:. Germans v/er;. outnum¬ 
bered bv 50 nor cent and srobabl’^ v/cre aliLe to maintain 
their Dosition onlv .because div;-.ded comaand )r:.vent‘,d 


Throuyh 


full concentration all Allied reserve, s. 


The. 


collarse oi 


Russia and Rumania enabled the Germajis to r:ain eoualitv 


Th... 


G 


r c. rman spr my 


in thwheest in the spriny oj? 19193. 
offensive narrov;ly missed success. Thereafter, the de¬ 
cline in absolute.' nuidbers which had beaun -- in riid-1917 - 
because of inability to rmlace losses -- continued to sap 
German strength at the. rat:, of over 200,000 o. ;.iont]i, ‘while 
American troops arrived at the rat,, of 250,000 a month. 



SECRET 


D • - 


The manpower position is even v/orse from the German 

point of view in 1943 than -it was in'1918, The defection 

oX" Italy has reduced German plus satellite armed strength 

to probably not over 10 million men, who oppose 20 million 

1 / 

Russians, British and A.mcrican troops, some 14 million 
of them in or at the shores of Europe. Guerrilla bands 
add significantly to the United Uations ' f ignore . On the 
main front, 4 million Amis troops oppose oi-mlllion Rus¬ 
sian. Host significant, the number of United nations com¬ 
bat troops in Em^opc and Russia-v.U. 11 grow, despite losses, 
v.iiilc the Gerr.ians have again readied the stage where the 
te.bsolute size of their armed forces of combat age must 
inexorably decline for lack of rcplacv..rients. The current 
rate of decline in ages 1G~34 is estimated at 150,000 per 
month. 

6. Germany was defeated in 1910 because the maxi¬ 
mum v/ar effort she coiaI.d generate wa.s o\’’erma.tchcd -- mater¬ 
ially and in manpower -- by her enemies. The same process, 
is being repeated in more emphatic terns in 1943. But 
certain contrasts bct"ween 1943 and 1913 deserve note. 
Anglo-American forces in 1943 have no foothold v.i thin 
''the inner fortress of Europe. The limitations of sea 
communications and transport prevent full oxerelse of 
the Icvcrag-c of t]ioir superior strength emtil they es¬ 
tablish a foothold. 


1/ Pot i.iCluGxnp 2 eiillion Russi-.e 


n 'intjrior ..)ol.f.ce. 





6 


Germany is well supplied v/ith submarines, \7ith puns, and 
with fighter aircraft, v/itli v/hicli to resist invasion. 
Deiring the coming period of bad bombing weather, her 
strength in fighter airers.ft may incrcas(- significantly. 

Unless t]ie Allies postpone invasion for a prolongod 
period while attempting decisive air bombiirdmcnt (of 
which the probable success. is-'.not judged lierc), failiir-^ 
of replacements for the German army in the face of groatl 
superior material and n'ombors will again bo the immediate 
condition of bi’eakdown. 



I-l SECRET 

THE GERIIAII V//iR EGQEOi.IY, 1918-1945; A COI.IPARISON 

I. .INTRODUCTION 

In the spring of 1918, after four years of v/ar, 
German strength seemed so formidable that the only hope 
of the Allied commanders was a determined defense which 
might hold out during the year, until increasing Ameri¬ 
can milito.ry participation could make possible a 1919 
offensive. Then, from the beginning of April, German 
power declined, until, in the autumn, Turkey was over¬ 
whelmed, the Bulgo-rian front crumbled, German forces in 
the west were thrown into retreat, revolution dethroned 
the IIohonzollci?ns, and Germany sued for pca.ee, ^ 

The autumn of 1943 a.gain narlcs the end of the 
fourth year of war. Again the United Statics has been or¬ 
ganizing for war for more than a year, aga.in major defeats 
have been inflicted on Germany and her allies, and again 
one of Germany’s allies is eliminated from the war. This 
is, then, the appropriate time for a detailed a.na.lysis, 
in order to determine v/hether the parallel with 1918 
runs deeper. It seems desira.blc not only to compare 
1943 with 1918, but to compare the change from 1917 to 
1918 with that from 1942 to 1943. 

II. CIVILIAN WELFARE 
A. Germany: General 

In 1943, cifter foeir years of war, the health 
and Vitality of Germany’s civilian population arc far 
better than in 1918, The economic blockade of the last 









11“ 1 


SECRET 


ivar was effective in reducinr; substantially/' the livinr^ 
standard of the Gcr:as.n people; in the present v/ar_, hoar- 
over, tlie agricultural Isaids at Gernany^s disposal arc 
so much greater in extent, substitutes for imports arc 
so .much further developed, and provision for storage so 
much more comiDletc, tha.t the loss of foreign trade has 
not materially affected Gcrmo.ny ’ s standard of living• 

The German Food Situation, 1013 and- 1943. 


u 


In 1918, the food shortage \/as so severe that 
tlio dally ration in 3crlin provided for only 1600 calorics, 
a.gainot estimated mininimi r'..quirm'ients for hca.lth sind 
efTicicncy of 2500 cs.loriv:.s per d-ay. ^ 3y contr:ist, the 
caloric voluc of tlie da.il"^ diet in October 1942 v/as 2320, 
s.nd the daily caloric inta]ce has gcncroll'y increo.sed somc- 
v;hat since that 1-ovr point,' The 1918 shortage of meat, 
fats, and oils ^/as particularly severe, Consuirq;tion of 
meat fell from a pre-vear average, of 1050 grams per p<;m’Son 
per v/ock' to an avera.ge of 135 grams per ■p-.-.rson per \/cck 
in the siiiimer of 1918. Cons'umption of fats and oils fell 
from a pre-war level of 2'3 grams per person per' v/ee]: to 
7 groiis per person per v;ock at th.c time of the armistice* 

At tliC present time, conscription of fats and oils in Ger¬ 
many is at least tu'ice as gr'oat as in 1918, while protein 
consumption per person is almost u'iree times- 'bhe 1918 
level. j.Ioreover, vitamin deficiencies in diet are nov/ 
v/idely suppli;.d by the use Df syntViOtic vitamins, which 
V7cre not available 


in 1918 








11-13 


SECRET 


1 / 


^ • C-crn::in _C_i v_i 1 ian lie a 1th and Efiicicncj, 1913 avid 10 43. 

The injurijiic orfocts of inadequate di^t in the 
G-crr.iany of 1913 \;crc v/idt.enroad. The average vrel^ht of 
the urban adult pooulation declined r.iorc than 20 percent; 
the birth rate in 191G \/as leec than half the prc-v;ar 
rate; aiid tlie death rate frori die case roco precipitately.' 
For Gjcar.iplc, the dcatli rate fro;:i tuberculosis, pro/.ioted 

by .rolnutriti .)n, ap )roxi;.iatcly doubled duu'iny the period 

2 / ' 

1914-1913. 

Ayainst these f^yur(;3, th.e 1943 vital statistics 
for Gernanv are nucli laor^ favorable. TTi^ berth rat', in 
the pr.^cont nar has d'-cll'i^-d less than 20 p^.rcent. Ex¬ 
cept for certain diseases of an epidemic natur',., the in¬ 
crease in diocaso-incidericw has been nuch siaaller in the 
1/ 

present v/ar. TTierc is no ovieonce oi’ a ycncral o.nd 
substantial decline 
population. 

The 1910 health and morale situation uas eiadc 

\ 7 orsc by serious fuel and clof-.inp shorto.yes. The shor- 

tapi. of fuel v/as du..; botli to a dcclane- in c:;o,l prod’'.ction 
to 

and/transportation diff iculti'.;s . linle some congestion 
exists in the transportatio.n system in 1943, tlae house¬ 
hold fuel supply has b'..eri iiuch m-re adecpuato than in 19 18. 

l/ The Reichsf;os-undhc.itsamt (estimated tliat betv/cen 1914 
aiid 1918, 762,000 deaths in G^nviany were attribut.abl'. to 
diet and clotliin^; dofIci-encics. Lack of sanitation duo 
to lack of soap should uioideubtcdly be includ'Od s.s a cause 
of tile sc deaths, 

2/ In tlie first half of 1918, tub'-.rculosis deaths saaounted 
"to 41,847, as c,):ipared v/ith 40,374 all of 1913. 

3 /. The tuberculosirj death rate Increased only from ,66 
fo ,81 per thousand betv/cen 1939 and 1942. 


in the aver aye \/ciyht of th<; adult 







II-3 


Cl 7T' 

1 li J ■ 


LliCcv/iGc, the preduotion .■f synthetic lib'.re on a lai^ac 
ecalc hae ;aadc It poeciblc to clothe thv. Gci'n.Ui civilian 
population far better in 194-3 tho>.n .in 191C. Diocorifoi’t 
exicte no\.^; cover., sufforina .occurred in the v/intcr of 


1913. 


Ti 


LUC th^ fiaurL 


c suagesr rnat 


the dcc]-inc in 


health and efficiency of thu Gcri-an people uac riuch 
greater in the uar of 1914-1913 thoai in the pr'..cent con¬ 
flict. In cpite of urban bor.ib dOiiace, no iriportoait short 
age of houcing has vet developed, both because j-iobiliza- 
tion of tht. arned forc^.c freed a significant amount of 
houcing, and because the practicu of d,)ubling up to accom 
I'loda.t.. shclterlecc far.iilicc lias b'.-cn goncrallv er.rploycd 
and uith success. Family lifcj iiac been dicruntcd by tiic 
practice of moving non-v/orking family members from hcavil 
bombud induGtrla.1 areas, but, aside fr.aa thic, adecjua.tc 
shelter has in general been available. It c-ems likely, 
theref u'’ t neither inadecyiat;. houcing nor inadcquah:e 

clothing nor inaduopaate nutrition v-ill seri-..oaGly affect 
the vito.lity of thm G'.,rman people in 1943, 

^ “ 3 onditi one Among Germany ' s__Opponent c . 

* 3y contract v;ith the German position in the cur 
rent var, the health and viti.lity of Germany's principal 
enemy, Fucsia, has declined more during the pres emit war 
than did the health and vitality of the major Furopc-in^ 

A11 i cm. dur i ng 1911 -1918. P o r c xar.ip 1 e , c jn c amp t i on o f 
broad grains per person in France doming 1918 wac about 








II-4 


t 


00 percent of the pre-v/nr level, and r.ieat coneiv.iption 
v;as 75 per cent of the prc-v.'oa''- avwrap;c. v;as not 

rationed lontil 1913, ul.ion tlic r.ionthl;^r alloi/ancv. per per¬ 
son ';;as at 750 {^raris; latc.r it e^o.n reduced to 500 e:ra: is 

Ho r(..strictions at all \/crc placed upon tli^. oonsur.iption of 


v/'ines and oils. Froia these figures it is apparont 


U XAy <. O' 


the French p>opulation suffered no serious priv.atlon froia 
food shorta£;cs. In Fncland the situation v;as lihcuisc 
relatively yood. By 1910,. tho submarine ricnac^'.' had been 
larycly over cone by tlie convoy systcr.i, ana food supplies 
v;erc noviny into the co^antry reyularly, 

Althouyh statxstics reflectiny the current 
Russian civilian pesiti-,)n arc neayre, those available 
indicate a very strinyent situation. Br^.ad, tlac staple 
of Russian diet, is rationed at the rate of 400 to 700 
yrar.is daily, dupendiny on the catcyory of the ratiurJaoldur 
(catcyorlcs ranyo fron that of essential v/o.r vejrkcr to 
oaiproductivc dependent) . Other foods G.re rationed .at 
the follouiny ;iont;ily rates: suyar, 100. to 500 yr.:uis; 
butter and substitutes, 400 to 800 yr:u.is; neat and 
substitutes, 300 to 2200 yrans; c^r^als, 1200 t-; 2000 
yrai.is. Foods in additii^n to those c-i'Vcr..d by rati.n^ al- 
loi/oaices arc c::tre::i^ly scarce and e::pcnsive, ana s.cc-U'-ainyly 
beyond the mad: of leost oi the. ui''ban population oi Russi:.. 
Th.. food position in Russia juis freque 





)een 

CVlOI 

i.i, Jj. w 

^f 

Li. i..w 

r.ac t 

til at 

and 

sons 

ti..ios 

ro.tion 




Il^'b 


SECRET 

values c sulci not be satisTiod cvc:n bv substitutes. 

It i.iav r-eassns.bl"^ be concluded, in view of 
Russia ts si.ibstantial food, clot'iinn, oaia fuel s'lsrt- 
a^cs at the present tine, that Russian civilian licalth 
and vitality have deteriorated aero in the nresent con 


riict ths.n did the health and vital!tv jf ti-ic ria j jr 
ICiu’opc an A1 lies by 1918. 



III. IITDUSTRIAL ililSQUHOES AIJD PRODUCTIQII 
A. General 

The basic industrial and military rcsoLa?GC is 
manpav/cr, and rundanacntally it v/as f.;r lack' oA nanponcr 
that Gerraany v/as defeated in 191G, But such a generali¬ 
zation is not very cnliyhtcnin£:; nor is it true in lui- 
quilificd Torn, for scarcity of certain stratc.yic r.iator- 
ial resomccs played its part. It \7ill. be v/oll to ano.- 
lyzo separately tl]rec aspects of the Goman position in 
1918* and in 1943, tv/o of v/hich depend in iriajor pa.rt o.nd 

the third a.lnoct entire 1” unon the total iiinnov/cr situo.- 
/ ^ - 


uion. Goman industrial resources and production, her 
output jf iiimitions, cuid her supply of i:illitc'n''y riary^ot'cr,” 
v/ill, in this and the' t\;o follov/in(; sections, be conpared 
in turn v;ith those of i.cr opponents duriny each of tho 
two conflicts. 

B• Industrial Output )i tlie 'Dclliccronts, 1914-1910 , 

The Goman industrial position, relata.vc to that 
of the Allies, v;as deteriorating in 1910 in t\/j respects. 


1 / 


.atari 

1—i 

r* 

^0 

9 

Gcr; 

na 

* ‘t/ 

v/as 

:\pproa 

china 

her 

L» 

t 

al 

su; 

PP 

f 

c 

jf 1 

B f*' ^ ^ 

C 

'■1 ^ r >-i ■’ r 

\ • -.I** V Vii/ Vv J. 

‘a 11 in 

r** 

•o 

beh 

ind 

t 

n - 

b of 

her 

jp 

ponents, 

Gerna 

n 

v; 

—i 

pr 

od 

■* T ■ 

11 on 

■^e o c; 

0 W/ 


Hie s 

h 


d 

.ICC 

r' r* 

•"S 

O 

bo ii 

idus 

tri 

?.l re- 


our cos said productive csap.ac 


y {greater tnan tnoso una<^r 
Gernan control. By 1918, the flov/ of .latv.rials frm v;ar . 
plants t:j the battlefronts -was yivinp the Allied arnics 

an increasiny preponderance in naterial strenyth. 

TT hven the supply of nil it ary nainpowcr depends in ps.rt 

upon the nsaouraT resource position. If industrial output 
per nan is hich, because of^favorable resorree conditions, 
norc men will be availsJole for the. serried forces. 







Ill 


■2 


I--I X 


In the heavy indue tries, which are tlie basis 

of nilitary production, Gernan output held up v/ell duu'’- 

ing the v/str period. A fairly reliable index of ninerals 

1,/ 

and r.ieta 1 s output in Gernanv is as follows: 

J. V 

1913 1914 1915 191G 1917 1913 


100 34 77 a35 89 




Tliero v;as a sharp. drop after 1913 because of 
iuobilisation of the arny and curtailrient of raw- ros.ter- 
ial imports; but output in 1918 was -almost as liigh as 
in 1914, and, except for ciutailment of war production 
in November, would probably h.ave been higher. The 

r • 

stability of the .index as a v:holo conceals declines in 
output of coal and of cortfiin non-forrous metals; balance 
by increases elsewhere, c. g. in aluiainuio. If clicmicals 
\;cro included in the iiide:::, the comparison botwocn 1913 
and earlier war vears ’,/ould be even more favorable.. In 
hngland, as in Germany, the output of mat'.>rials impor¬ 
tant for r.nuiitions output v/as maintained or porb^aps in¬ 
creased, Francu, ho\/cvc?a, lost about tlu’cc-fifths, 
one-fifth, and ono-third of her pre-v;ar iron and stool, 
coal, and towctilc capacity through invasion, euivd her 


output in the 

ho 

a.vy Indus 

tr 

Thus 

Germany * s 

out pur 

in 

a.i.. . 
Oil, 

leas 

t as well 


••-''-1 -T -j- 

O - 'w/ 

of 

Fr. 

1 / 

The index 

* 1 vt 
X O 

f rori 

an 

lUl' 


A1 V/oh3.3tc 

KJ L» 

c 

G 

i-e 

the 



■ 1 Lcononi. 


J. ^ 












In total industrial output, i/hich is loss 
important i’cr military purposos, Gorr.iany dial not Tar 
so noli r.;lativo to Great Britain. . dotal industrial 
■production in both Germany and Lnyland declined froi.i 
1914 to 1010. Comparative indices for GermLary and 
England arc as follov/s: 



1918 

1914 

1915 

1913 

rmimZ 

1910 

Germany 

100 

83 

G7 

0 “bt 

32 

37 

England 

100 

93 

94 

o 

O / 

84 

79 


of total frci^jct originating 

'-i-/ 


neither indc:: can be ror^arucci as h 

liable, lloxjovcv, an indo:: 

in a number of important German industries”' drous by 

24 percent from 1914 to 1918, and it seems certain tint 

this indc:: significantly understates hio decline in total 

2 / " 

industrial output. The :.ndc:c of industrial output pre¬ 
sented above is thus corroborated. Th^ English indc:: 
is based upon scanty ..vidcncc, but it may safely be 
asserted that the decline in industrial output in Bri¬ 
tain v:as less than in Germany. 

The decisive industrial advantag.. of the Allies 
in 1918 lay, hov/cver, not in their gvnatcr success in 

maintaining production, but in their possession of 

T7 The index is \ eigl^'tsd by c.iployment in eaciL imlustry. 

Tt is ^ from the study by \/ohlstetter . 


/ 


Primarily because t]:is 


not i: 


Ccr 01 industries v;hioli dccl; 
output o.s LC ;:.biolc. 


.de:: doc 
,ned more than 


1 O -l- 


num- 


d 1 d me-Ustem1 








III-4 



gw 

C ■ 1 * j -1- 

of 

A>-le 

rica. 

lat 

of 

tlie 

to 

t:io 

re- 


sources of tile \/orld so that there v/as no acutw sliort- 
a^e of any strategic r.ioetcrial. British Industi’ial 
capacity \/:is diverted to Y;s.r production ls.ter thnn v/as 
that of (jeraany, and that of the non-be 11 iguana it United 
States aiuch more slowly. But even as early as 1915, 
the flow of materials from Ameielca bolstered bhe allied 
position. By the summer of 1918, even thou-fsi the United 
States’ war program vias not in full swin'y tjic increas¬ 
ing diversion of Britisii and Aanrican r,:sour' 


outout gave thv- All: 
scribed in Section IV. 
G. German Shorta 


o L/j 


.10 advanta.'p. in cc!uior:n.nt de¬ 


nes of Stratcaio hatcrlals 


91G 


Germany’s position itcis ;;cahwnv.d in 1918, not 
niircly bv her total industrial lAfei/ioritv, :rit bp tlie 
n>,-.ar-exhaust ion of }ier stocks of Gv.i't'.in strategic 
materials for which she had depended upon external 
sources. In addition to textiles, idiich were very im¬ 
portant for the. standard of livin._j, ihe'S'- includ-id 
cortalri mat..rials of strategic significance in a miJ.it ar^ 
sense, especially oil and rubber. Broduction of substi¬ 
tutes was quite inadequate, and t!ie gradual c:diaustion 
of stocks created a sc.rious siLtuatdon. Ilotor fuels 
and lubricants are said to hav^. been e::tr.,.;iv;ly scarce'* 
throughout 1918, and rubber was so tirbt that man-r f^uo'a 










SECRET 


cuid O-utomobllcs v/crc rvoinin,^ on iron oirco, Tlicro io 
little donbt that these GhortarjCS, tor’etlier v/ith a ser¬ 
ious situation in the replaconsnt of horses on the 'res¬ 
tern front, restricted, the inobility of the arny in its 
last great offensivos. 3y the tir.ic of. the o.ri:iisticc, 
the oil situation v;o,s desperato, and in itself v;as pro¬ 
bably sufficient to prccludo th^ possibility of furtl..or 
■:.ffcGtive resistance. One of tlie most important contri 
butory factors in Austria-Hungary’s collapse is said to 
have been lack of lubricants to keep the railuay system 
operating on anything like ti.e rccuir^.d level. 

D. The G-crnian Posib ion, 19d3. 

In 1943, there am: no Ckmiaan shoi^tagcs com- 
para-AL; to the 191G lack of tentilcs, pctroleuit., rub¬ 
ber, and horses, though the stcul alloy and petrolcuja 
positions are^ rather tight. In this raupcct G-.mmany 
is far better off than in 1910. The ].)roduction of syn¬ 
thetics and to a lessor extent pre-^7ar stockpiling and 
successf ul cup 1 oitat ion of occupied t..rr itor ie s, c . g ., 
the extraction of Ru.ianian oil, mclybdonu;^, 

and Russian mangancs.., have piuvontcd the shortages 
■ /hich developed in 1913. The loss of ferro-alloys from 
Russia and Finland v/ould, liox/ovor, eiake th... 1944 f.,rro- 
alloy position very tight. Clothing needs o;C t-m civil 
Ian population and many industrial and military needs 
are being met nith syntietic teiitiles. five ionidrod 
thousand tons of synthetic fibers, or ov^u one-half 
the total supply, 650,000 tons of synthetic ge..trol.;u 


0i 





Ill" G 


O -Lj 11 .j X 


products, or over one-third of the total supply, in 
the nc.ighborhood of 170,000 tons of synthetic rubber, 
or enough to nioet all essential reeuirenents, are be- 

y 

ing produced in 1943. ho one riatcrial is criticall;;" 
short. This is true in spite of borabinys to date, in¬ 
cluding that of Ploosti. Future bombings or tia^ occu- 
peetion of A::is-controlled areas iiavr of course clningc 


the supply position for 1944. 

Diirina the first herld 


. J V «. X ^ ^ A~ . . t ‘L. * -U .1 . -W t ^ 


the occupied territories 


f i t 10 C-r 0 r m a ry - - 


.f- JV*. 


uer'.. not of gr^nit economic bene 

.1...u..rials seised 


h-0(j u L/.i.frx o C‘ uooiv-kw 


Ox 


at the time of occunation brouaht imoortant. temnorar'^?' 


relief . 

ihis 

J- V 

0 X . . L X/ 

•> 1 

, in spip 

.. Oi 

bitter ' 

-jO ^ ^ r-i ' ri 
X X ► 

I i ^ 1 • r * ( n 


spots, (> 

..rmnny 

1 1 n 5: 

.. X ...V 

made lier 

p r* 

up ation 

more 

f~\ ' t \ n 

V y>*: ' y “Jg | ' 5 

.. a ^N.X 'L^ X 

« 

• 

Hot only 

hav e 

the 

conoucred 

j. 

p r*. 

0 i- r 1 1 -i 

,te ?eo 

,.as rmn 

»N ; -S ^ • 

X e X 

valuable:. 

f lov/s 

o.f 

Curtain b 

adder 

t 

needed 

s 0 n" 

1. - 'w< .i. 

■> n • t 

'P . ri 0 1 ** 

^ L».wl 

r-^r 

■■ t.! 


have bol.stercd G-^ni.ian uar suonly as a \fiiol'.. , 

J. ^ u' 


j. i J. - — .X U .. 


of goods and services frosi cnter^ial Furop- to v-er-iany 
in 1942 IS cstlmat<'..d (in value terms) at one-f‘if th of 


Germany’s domestic v/ar expenditure. Thao contribution 
may have declined some'X'i.at in 1943. 


J_-.l !)0.0 O L' 


m o 


• 1 

‘G. ii 


riov; of [^^oorlo 
. Gone Ti 


* >y <1 a->Tr ; /% . 
i. aV» e O ^ . \ .X V. > 


.r» 


has been the flo\; of manpovmr. oome live ::iii..ion s'oi 
cign civilian eorhors, in addition bo on,, and one- 


-10- X. X 


1 


I.la, X o'X-iU X o vJX vvc.Lx ^ 


'pr- 


O'}' r--, - -.T • 

'-v X • > '..i a j n 


- - . 4 . X 


^ X vXU .W ~ 


many. 


'• ".■'S’ ' o t c 

w'..x<-v.«xy' isj 


indii s 1.1' i: -1 o ee: • b 11.1 


O N - ■ r r 

.. o a. 


~ X . .i. .L , -.n. 

U 


manpouer prcbl^.::., a£ 


X 

X O 


n'O 0*1QI q 

. < X X <-• «X j. <.y X -1} 


^ -I •»<"< . I ■ ~r* 
^ ^ u<. x w . X. 


Ty , 1 >h f y'it 
• - ^ "^Xx Xj X^^v^M xi j ^ *..•%. h .X ^ J. s 

1/ m. A. 


rve oi labor pov’ 


T 


neon 


1 


./ All data are in .letric tons. 








III-7 



i/hioh to mobilization ohai’ni'r docronocd tbc cionM- 

i oj'i 1 Ou Ixji r force. E:: c e t i o r t ].io ii t i ]. i z n t i on o f f o r o i nn 
v/orl-:cro, toto.l induotriol output and \;ith it v;ar output, 


nould have declined sliarpl:' in 194-2 and 1943. It i 


r: 

tJ- 


estimated that, a.pa.rt irora bomb da.:'.io.p-„., it did decline 
slipl'itly (porhaeps 3 percent) from 1942 to 1943, aied 


■-••1 .*s.t 


ratw of ovitout b" 


bombing has a.ddi tionally reduced the 
bet\;con 5 and 10 pore.nit, durinp the last half of 1943. 


’iithout the c:j:ploitatioi 




foreign 


N..L ^ O 


'.;nc 


Cl c 1 ii'i V 


mould have been proatoi 

”1 Ti 

J.. 




nr 


1 f' f' 


•j-err.ian \;ar ourpue 


^ rt 


n*-** s ... 


C.lCl 


j- 

U- le-I. u 


I . ... 

I i 


dr:clnv^a 


'1 


_ —• 7 I _ • *9 

3 'a 5 *• ■. *t '1 T* 't ''■'OP 

-c i. / J. . ^ _W u J_ J ~ 1 ^ 


J.t. p 
u* i.L» 


OCOLl'OiCU 


arcc-s Is probabl'/ 

X t/ 


■pi -I *1 1 rv" <■: r* ri 

d- t L J- J- e < O ; .^ w/ c.v »-. . j i, - 

V 


y-/.-J. 


mam mum no:;:- 


sibie mar outuut of G-ermany alone bcfoj.u.; her conquests 

^ , i J ^ 


ocE^-n. 


Compar ison \/±th the All ied position, 1943 

fhe German industrial position rclativ 

O v* r"'-o ^ *1 ^ •'* c oir.'* 00*^10 X’ 1 <1 n *-> ci . {'** i / c* '< * i** 

.L a.O X O }.' • Ot 1C/1 - 0 o .i- 1X w V X i>..X V-/ -i- ^.y o o - » kj Lx ■<-J . >L, h' k— i X 


to th'sb 


943 


■9 ? 

-| 'i* T7 0 C' 0 V-- 

X L/ V ^ u*. *.o. Xx- 


191G, 


ma" DC CDitomized oy s’cmiariziny sn-j s 


.nd for th 


r- r 1 f '■ i • 


O 


/ U- v..# 


• i o C' '^y-j 

X_ , -V* U. W N. i,> \J X J. 

n - I j 

f 1 Y’ ''.>1 

_ fcj .U u u*.. U .... ,’x X « 


The 1945 steel prodi.ction of Axis Europe and Japan com¬ 


bined is some 45 million inyot tons. Ih 


r;^-* , +- 


O ^ '» “i * 

. .1 iu V .‘ J, 


k.- _L. y 


Great Gritain, 


and the bni 


L/ 


■J C* . JU 

-I G V *L/ O » > 


- • . -i i - '*'? *!* / ('* .p IP'PIT'T' 

..k , J S., ^ , '-X vG O 






120 million ingot rietrxc tons- 


/cll over bU; 


- t r .-s -y -I 


one - 


half times as much. 


r'y C« 

P r'l 

V-' O 


. -O 

J-l. 

JX 

t/... 1 


J— 

. ' ' TO p , o 

^ .■ .L'^ X ^X \J ^ 


.la” 

C/ 


o c 


•! • p 1 •" / IP 
I../ •.••J,... V^f i. 


1 


a cn.xdc 


hicacaru; 

Uf *1 j_ t o d X«a u j_ 01 


* ... J. Uy i y-X i J. V.-1. e - .W# U X „ ♦ - <• - ^ . WX i v-v^. - - .' — U , iXy 


*% rt 

XkO 


O 


over th 


r ** 


. - ,1 

X XX .. .L • 


\/ll. 


f 1 ' ov •» p -r 1 ^ <~i O .-*00 ^ / /-'I 

kX -* J. xX-^vkO ,-L 'vkJUJ^^V.X. 













in indnGtrir.l strength cinco 1910, Hus sis. and tlic Uni 
States ha\’-e Drogi’cssod r.urc ranldl'’. Having failced to 

j. ». t/ w* 

conaU'^r England and Hussia scforc their strength cnualle 


her jv/n, and hso/ing failed to blocli the sv/clling flo'/; 


-.f 


xiCiT goods froia the United States, Uornsaiv in 1943 fac^s 
the full no\/cr of a comtaination ahich induetriall-- as 
\7cll 0 .C in nanponcr is far stronger tluan slie. 

On the United Hations 
no inorc a llriiting factor in 1943 than thev none in 1^41 

9 

The production of synthetic rifobcr to rcplacv. the n.atuane 


ki) Ct Ob _s_»v/ .1.:.'^ 


V*n1 O “P i* 'n ^ \ nin r** ‘"I / / ■ T ) 7 '\ “hi u1 <"! 11 p n 

/ v>L Ip.^ O O Vb./ ^ (J W , J ^ < A A Jp* 'wL ^ ^ Vp/ 

f 

stxtution of nany other materials for tin, solvod tv/o 
major problems. Ihn:, as during 1914-1910, swollin 
output is not associated n. 


v.'ni" 


-■-T . 

I 


i“ ' f'‘^ r-* -'A • -| m i ■'*'" g ■j-g '■» to ^ 'h ^ 

hj.j. O ^ X X i. ko go ./xa'.*-h.ai , »L '.* J»^1\..>.L w-X w \. u 


total outnut of siatcrlals. 


synthetic r'o.bbcr, 


.L 




is true 


• 1 I ♦• 

*oa..i.u X--. 


aliauinun. 


ana an coroain s-uraregic nao 


» U. ^ . JL kj> 


used in small auantities, there have been s ctacular 
increases. United States plus Canadian orod '.ction of 
aluminum, for example, v/liich \/as less than 2100 million 
ingot ooujids in 1942, totalled 1600 million ii.i^ot noeoiads 
during the first half of 1943. But total U;‘iited Hations 
output jf carbon steel in 1943 v;ill have incr used b-' 


less than 10 ocrccnt sibovc 1941 


climbing during 1942, 


and coooer outnut, af1 

a. J. • — 7 

vullcn in 1943, 


U '•w/ 


T* T<» 1 -> “P i ■ 1 o ; • Cl 

xl«p^ ..t-kX Xl ^ v -y X. O A 


n -j- f • -1 •“ "I . .'-\T T, TT*^-. V-. 

<• ^ ^ ... ^ ^ 'o.f . J V ^ ^ 


; o 

.; kw- 


n o ^ /*\ ,-1 ■ 
uj kJ • % j. ex • 


Direct military 


consuiv^tion 


1. 


ic Ui'it 


cd Stat 


of strategically im/ortant materials shnyed increases 




III-9 


lXIj JL 


froir. 1941 to 1942 varyin." iCron 20 0 to 500 porc.oit, 
Ililitory consumption of aluriinu-i, 54 purc^.nt of the 
total supply in 1941, ros^. to 34 percent in 1942; 
that of Conner from over one-third of total sunnl^- 


(* 

in 

1 QAO . 

.j. (./ .1. ^ ^ 

^1 

^ 

sunnl^- to 


over tuo-thirds. 'llltar-' consunntion ef steel 

-t- 

last quarter of 1941 nas 4.o million i. 
fifth uf the total United States supply. 


• J . T 

! ■ 9 ..Or' 

J- ... i 1/ - J. 


^ - J- J- . - ... 

^ O 0 U »w 


in e. ii.: 




IS' 


from October t'U’ouph Do-comber 1942 it \;as 12.3 siillion 
tons, over half of total supply, and :uo amount equal to 
tile total output for all purposes in J.eepan plus Ax.is 


T"* 


Jeur Ope 







IV-1 


SECRET 


IV. MILITARY SUPPLIES 


A. Genoral 


Tlicro is no clear dGi;iarcation bouv/eon indnstrlal 
rGSOLircoa and r.illitary supplies, and hence aucl: oP nhat 
was said in the preceding section is equally relevant here. 
For exanple, oil and rubber arc in a sense vital .riilitary 
supplies. It has already been noted tliat severe scarcities 
in these riatorials, and in the nunber oP houses,- intor- 
Pered v/ith the mobility oP the Grcrnan ari.iy in the great 
1918 oPPonsives, \;]illo the Allies, tha". ks.. to tlaoir'ready 
access to Porcign sources of supply'-, did not suPPer from 
a s ir.ii 1 ar oI'.ib ar r a s s non‘b, 

By the suiumer oP 1918, the Allies enjoyed an in¬ 
creasing ' superiority in volume oP mat oriel. This \io.s not 
due to any Pailure oP Aerr.icui munitions production, nor 
did it denote incomplete equipment oP Crorman units. Just 
as the German level oP output oP basic materials v/o.s adc- 
q_uatc v/ith relation to the size oP the war ePPort, so also 
was the level oP output oP i.iunitions. For the mahpower 
which Germany placed on the Pield, she produced an ade¬ 
quate supply oP riPles, machine guns, artillery,* and amiiuni 
tion--thougli the ar.iiiunition situation was somewhat tiglit 
in 1918. The Allied superiority in materiel was merely a 
component part oP the widening margin oP su^jeriority which 
developed tliO-t year in the total Allied i/ar cfPort. 







IV-2 


SECRET 


B. Goniparcitivc Production jf IlatoricTa liforld Mclt I , 

Production of mimitions increased steadily on 
both sides. Bi'itish production of riunitions of alnost 
all kinds increased throu.( 3 hout the y/ar^ up to and includ¬ 
ing 1918. Curtailnent of a fev/preduction schedules v;a.s 
due to sufficiency of supply, rather than to I aileirc of 
production. United States" production, vhilc it did not 
get under v/ay in time to add to supplies at the front in 
early 1910, did assui-’o future supplies and tlius enable 
a free use of c;:isting stocks. Gonbined’ Britisli and 
Ar.ierioan production of r.iachine guns rose fron 07,000 in 
1917 to 040,000 in 1918, and of rifles fron 1,500,000 to 
3,500,000. (In addition, the United States brought into 
the war 600,000 Sprihgfields,) British production of 
artillery incrcas.ed sufficiently- to supply the swelling 
/uicrican arr.iy. Ar.iericon production of service airplanes 
leaped fron 13 in the first quarter of 1918 to over 2,000 
in tile last quarter. This however, was more significant 
as a promise for 1919 tho.n as a source of power in 1918, 
Because of this increasing output, the amount 
of equipment in the field increased steadily. For ex¬ 
ample, not counting a fc\; obsolescent pieces us^d early 
in the war, the British Expeditionary Forces alone had 
the folloviing supplies of guns on the v/cstern front at 
various dates: 




IV-3 


SECRET 


Field r;;uiie Heavy 

and :iov/itz8rs c^ons 


25 Sept 1915 

1987 

120 

1 July 1916 

5237 

576 

17 April 1917 

4006 

1620 

21 Mar. 1918 

3961 

2093 

11 IIov, 1918 

4273 

2215 


To pictm-’e the total increase in Allied strildnc 
pov/er in the V/est, even if no allov/ance is r.iade for in¬ 
crease in French strength, the growth in i^ov/er of tlie 
American army must be added to the growth in British 
equipment strength, 

•• But C-orman production of rronitions was like¬ 
wise increasing. Monthly production of various items 
increased as shown below. 




Production 

Powder: 


(tons; 

Oct. 

1915 

4,750 

Apr. 

1917 

8,000 

Anr. 

1918 

12,000 

Oct. 

1918 

14,300 

Machine 

guns; 


Aug . 

191C 

2,300 

Autumn 

1917 

14,400 

• 

O 

O 

1918 

13,000 

Light Artillery: 


Dec* 

1915 

480 

p'’ob. 

1918 

1,943 

June 

1918 

about 2,500 


For the manpower which Germany was able to 
place in the field, there v/as a surplus of rifles, 
machine guns, and light field pieces, .Heavy artillery 
was somewhat short, but this v/as due to a lack of trained 
artillery men, rather than of guns. 

I.Iotor pools v/erc scarce in Germany; this is 
traceable to the oil and rubber scarcities. 







IV-4 


SECRET 


As to tanks, the Alliod position.v/as oven- 
Y/hclr.iingly superior to the Goman. Some idea of this 
disparity can bo gathered from the follov/ing data. 
British (not Allied) tanli production in 1910 v/as 1,591 
units. German production figures arc not available, 
but they must have been very small since only 90 tanks 


reached the front on the German side in the vdiole of . 

\ 

1918, and of these only 15 v/ere of German make, the rest 
being captured machines. German expcD.-’ts after the v/ar, 
hov/ever, v/ere unanimous in attributing this admittedly 
very serious German lack to tlic failure of the High Com¬ 
mand to appreciate the value of tanks in good’ time and 
not to the inability of German industry to build them. 

VJith regard to planes also the balance v;as 
clearly on the Allied side in 1918. Ho good comparative 
production-or sti^cngth figures have been foemd, but tlic 
position at the time of the Armistice is probably.a rea- 

4 

sonablc indc:; of the situation tliroughout the Ovarlier 
months of the year. American■figures give the Allies 
(France, Britain, H. S. and Belgium) 5,972 ''battle planes'* 
as against Germany’s 2,750. (Italy and Austria-Hungary 
in this ease practically cancel each other, a circumstance 
v/hich suggests that their omission from this entire com¬ 
parison is not a serious matter.) 

ViTLiile the Germans did not suffer from specific 
shortages of equipment, except for tanks and planes, they 
did suffer from lack of food, clothing. 


and foo dstuffs . 



IV-5 


SECRET 


It became gradually apparent that the entire German war 
effort was inadequate to cope v/ith the ^^owinc Allied 
strength. Allied superiority grcY/ as 1918 v/ent on. • 


^ • Comparative Production of Ilateriel, World \7ar II , 

During the present war, superiority of the 
United nations over the Axis in output of military 
supplies v;as clearly evident even in 1942, In combat 
aircraft, for example, the European Axis x-^3?oduced 
4,800 iolan.es in the last quarter of 1942, compared 
with a-combined British and American output of 13,200. 
For field pieces, the corresponding figures are 2,055 
and 5,730; for machine guns, 38,000 and 327,000, In 
most categories of mnanitions, combined British and 


/uaerican production for the last quarter of 1942. was 


three or four times the output of the European Axis. 
The rulevant figures' arc presented in table w.mch 


p^-U'-s bolov.'. To these figures must be added Russian 
output totals, 

T fs r->T •p 1 

JL ♦ 

AI.rCRICAU AIID BRITISH EI.IPIRE AND ESTIJIATED EUROPEAU /JCIS 
PRODUCTION OP IIILIT;J1Y SUPPLIES 
Fourth Quart'.r 1942 

Type European Axis /jmorlcan Bri- 

Production tish Production 


Combat Aircraft'. 

4,800 

13,200 

i.Iachine Guns 

38,000 

327,000 

Rifles and Small Arms 

1 

,050,000 

1,086,000 

Field Artillery 
(75 mm and over) 

2,055 

5,730 

Anti-Aircraft Guns 

■ 5,330 

23,800 

iUiti-Tank Guns 

2,700 

12,000 

Tanks 

3,100 

12,300 

Trucks 

63,000 

223,600 








IV-6 


SECRET 


ConGidcpat ion of conpo.rativc production trends 
in 1943 r.iakcG the contrast between Axis o^nd United Nations 
output even more- inprossivc. The increase in superiority 
of United Nations cquipraeiit and nuaiitions over that of 
the *'*xis, in 1943, is .even more rapid than v/as that in 
1918. This is due essentially to the fact that, in ro- 
ga.rd to prodiiction of war floods, the United States is 
nov; in a position, vh i eh corresponds to v/hat would have 
been a.ttaincd in 1919, rather than to 1913, survey of 
the statistics \7ill r.iahc the situation clear. 

Geriaan military production co-n hardly bo 
significantly r^roatcr now th.an in 1942, s.nd yvcll 

be less, h'ar production, beyun lony before 1939, v/as 
alreOLdy under full sv/iny by 1942, The only increase 
miyht be from yreatcr curtailment of civilian production, 
and in view of the already r:.strict^-d civilia.n position, 
the possible shift could not be yrcat, Ayainst this must 
be set the estimated decrease in total industrial output 
referred to in the previous section. Perhaps some de¬ 
terioration of industrial capite.1 must now be moxle yood, 
Consideriny these factors, the assumption tho.t the cur¬ 
rent rofGO of wo.r output is equal to the aver aye rate 
for 1942 is undoubtedly a ma.ximun assumption. 

< I ' 

This does not mco.n that Germo-ny cannot in some 
catcyories throw into battle more equipment tlian she has 
hitherto used. In s^rtillery In ycneral, .anti-aircraft guns 
in particular, and amm'unition, her position has probably 



IV-7 


SECRET 


.been eo easy that she can, v/hen the occasion arises, 
increase her use oi these itcris ana still r.iaintciin her 
strength, Curtaiir.ient "bf her oroauction of tanks nay 
iia.vc freed capacity for other use. In subr.iarines, her 
strength i:iay have increased through 1942 and the first 
third of 194-3, and her position in 1945 nay be, in nun- 
bers, nuch better than the average position in 1942. Sub¬ 
marine effectiveness for attadzing convoys lias, however, 
been much reduced by Allied countcrnieacurv;S, In airplanes, 
v/astage has currently ciccccded production, but production 
is being a.ccclcra.ted said v/astago must bo stepped up if 
total strength is to be kept from increasing. 

Consider on the other liaaid the bnited Ilo.tions 
position, Russia. ha.s starved her civilian inOaastry to 
feed the r.iilit.ary. Her military output has Increased 
significantly from 1942 to 1943, 

The military output trends for the British 
Empire and the United States arc presented in tadolcs on 
,thc following page. They indicate that the only category 
in which output has not risen more than 50 percent* from 
the 1942 quarterly aa/orage to the second opaarter of 1943 
is gun ammunition, of v/hich there is a surplus. The in¬ 
crease in pro.ductiwi of heavy bombers was 106 percent. 



IV-3 
-bio 2 


SECRET 


;j.ierig;.n aiid British ehpire hateriel, 

1942-1943 PRODUCTION: D0LL;J^ IAJLUES 
(in millions of dollars) 


Type 

Quarterly 
'Average, 1942 

First Quarter 
1943 

Second Qu: 
tcr-1943 

Combat vehicles L . 
Self-propelled 
artillery 

786 

1171 

1314 

Artillery (o the r 
than s.p.) 

332 

555 

52.7 

Small o.rms A in¬ 
fantry weapons 

533 

476 

496 

Gun ammunition 

644 

608 

673 

Small arms anununi- 
tion 

365 

G85 

032 

Aircraft bombs 

' 136 

217 • • 

222. 


Table 3 



AFRICAN AND 

BRITISH EHPIRE 

PRODUCTION 



OF COLIBAT airplanes, 1942-1943 
(number of units X-^^'oduced) 


Type 

quarterly 

Average 

1942 

First 

^^uarter 

1943 

Second 

(q^uarter 

1943 

Second 

Quarter 1943 
as Percent of 
1942 v^uarterly 
Average 

Heavy bombers 

1139 

2313 

3265 

186 

Other bombers 

and flying 

3965 

5280 

6650 

167 

boats 

Fighters 

5470 

6736 

7917 

144 


In interpreting these data, it must be remembered 
that Germany had a stock of munitions at the beginning of 
the v/ar far greater than that of the United Nations. 


V/hereas the main funcuions of German production in recent 
years has been to make good v/astage, the United Nations 














IV~9 


SECRICT 


(other than Russia) have had to give their armies their 
Initial stock of equipment, and to fill supply channels 
leading from the points of production to distant theaters 
of operation. Allowance must be made, too, for diversion 
to the Pacific theater. 

On the other hand, the data take no account of 
Russian production. If Russian supplies of munitions in 
June 1941 are taken as a partial offset to the German stock 
of equipment, and if current Russian production is set 
against British and American diversion to the Pacific, it 
is clear that during 1943 (much earlier in some categorios) 
the United Nations have been building up a great and 
rapidly increasing superiority in equipment. Both the 
superiority and its rate of increase far exceed those of 
1918. But in certain categories especially needed for 
defense, German is either very strong now (antl-aircx’aft 
guns), or has been rapidly increasing production (fighter 
airplanes). 



I 


I 


/ :(W' v 

i I , , . ' 


I 






r 


I' 


i 


J ‘ 



) 


f.A r v> 




■< 


i 





/» 


.r- 


t.j** 


f 


I * 


% 




# 


jy^ V 'I 


» ■ 




'» 



I 


• I 









|.' I* .' 'i 

k0^ i 


t j * 




V-1 


V. niLITAKY kai\pov;lr secret 

a* ‘ G-eneral 

For a time in the spring of 1913, Germany's strength 
in military maripovjer in the iield was greater, relative to 
. that of her opponents, than it had been since 1914, But the 
spring offensive failed, and thereafter the relative.,manpo\/er 
situation deteriorated rapidly. 

At no time between the full mobilization of the 
Allied forces and the collapse of Russia had the armies of 
the Central Powers approached in size the combined strength 
of the Allies. While accurate statisticis are impossible 
to obtain, it is probably true that throughout this period 
the armies of Germany and her associates--including both 
..combatant and non-combatant troops--fell short of 12 million, 
while those of the Allies ranged three million or more 
higher. 

B. Comparative Military Manpower, Vtforld War I . 

p’rom 1915 through 1917, the English and French 
armies on the v/estern front outnumbered the Germans by at 
least 50 percent, and possessed equally great superiority 
in equipment. An important reason for German3r'.s ability to 
maintain her position in the face of these odds was the 
absence of unified comiuand among the English, French, and 
Italians. Lacking one command, the Allies failed to pool 
their reserve strength, either on the offense or on the 
.defense.• The greatest Allied concentration at a given point 
v;as always the greatest possible P’rench or British concentra¬ 
tion, never that vhich might have been achieved b^^ a combina- 





S E C R E T 


V-2 


of 

tion/all available French and all British reserves. 

The strength‘of the German army reached its peak 
in absolute terms at•about the middle of 1917. Thereafter 
it declined* The reasons were tv/o* Heretofore German 3 ' had 
been reaching deeper into her manpov/er barrel for men; now 
she v/as close to the botton, and had to depend largel^^ upon 
the ageing of the young male population for her new crop of 
soldiers. A complementary factor was the necessit^^ of in¬ 
creasing deferments of potential soldiers to maintain 
adequate production of munit-Lons. A iisostv/ar coimiittee of 
inquiry estimated that perhaps one million men fit for 
service were de'ferred. Except for this one million men, 
and possibly some artisans and small tradesmen, everj’- 
physicall 3 ^ available man was in the military forces. From 
mid-1917 on, net casualties exceeded inductions. 

Nevertheless, v;ith the collapse of Russia's huge 
army and the. crushing of Rumania's twenty?- divisions, Germany's 
relative position suddenly improved tremendously. Because 
of the Russian and Rumanian collapse, the total strength 
of the Allied armies was reduced to between 12 and 13 
million, including two million American troops almost all 
of whom were still in the United States. Nine million of 
the Allied total were French and nritish. Numerically/, 
the.armies of the Central rowers totalled over 11 million, 
of whom over 7 xnillion were German. In combatant troops, 




SECRET 


a british War Cabinet coinmlttee reckoned Allied strength at 
5,4 millions, as against 5.2 for the Central Powers. 

In early 1917, the Allies had possessed the 50 
percent superiority'rdferrod to above, on the v;estern front. 
But to\;ard the end of the- 3 ^ear, the^/ were forced to rush 
troops to Italy,‘even while Germany began to shift 1.5 
million or more meni/from fhe Russian and Rumanian fronts 
to the west. In December, the divisional count in France 
was: Germans, '151 divisions; Allies, 169. Since an Allied 

division was apparently betv/een 5 and 10 percent larger than 
a German strength, the discrepancy in numbers v/as still 
considerable, but by late march, when the Germans began 
their last great drive, their divisions numbered about 
190, to 170 for the Allies~-a position of cqualit^m In 
May the count was 204 to 188, again approximate equality. 

The last 40 German divisions were however second-rate 
troops, while the additions to Allied strength v/ere fresh 
though poorly trained Americans. 

The German drive failed. Details of its near suc¬ 
cess need not be narrated here, except to note that the 
crisis brought unification of Allied command at last. Once 
the offensive failed, the German position rapidly deterio¬ 
rated. Tire accretion of manpo\/er from the East was a never- 
tc-be-repeated accession of capital strength. Since losses 


2/ Of the total of 1 5/4 million v;ho were there. 




V-4 


SECRET 

exceeded gains, there v;as an Inexorable decline in manpower 
month by month, as combat attrition wore away manpo\/er. To 
this problem v;ere now added serious difficulties connected 
with'the disintegration of troop morale. Desertion, going 
over to the enemy, refusal to rejoin units after leave, 
slacking, etc., all became common occurences. Total loss ■ 
of strength exceeded inductions by over 200,000 per month. 
The average strength of battalions steadily declined until, 
by the end of the year, it \."as little more than half of 
that called for in the army's tables of organization. 

On-the Allied side the picture, which had been 
dark enough during the spring days of 1918, rapidly improved 
during the remainder of the year. United States troops 
arrived in France in unexpectedly large numbers. They were 
for' the most part poorly trained, but their freshness and 
their numbers had an enormously invigorating effect on the 
spirits of the exhausted French and British. There is no 
doubt -that their arrival became the dominant factor in the 
'v/hole manpo\;er situation 'by the time of the Armistice, 

How, from a/ purely quantitative standpoint, matters had 
changed from the approximate equality of the early months 
of the year to the time of the Armistice may be seen from 
the following table... 



SECRET 


Y-5 


Table 4. 

Comparison of Combatant Strength on the Y/est Front 
(approx. 11 ^^ovember 1918) 


Allies 

British 

French 

U. S. 

Italian 

Belgian 


1 , 202,000 

1.554,000 

1,175,000 

23,000 

115,000 


Central Pov/ers 
German 

Austro-Hungarian 


2,912,000 

100,000 . 


Total Allied 4,069,000 • Total Central Powers 5,012,000 

Even at the time of the Armistice, the Germans 
Y/ere no worse off than the^’ had been during 1915-1917. The 
difference lay in the exhaustion of German oil supplies, 
the shortage of feedstuffs, food and clothing, even at the 
front, the increased effectiveness of the Allied command, 
and above all Germany’s utter inability to replace her 
losses of over 200,000 a month, while a quarter of a million 
fresh American troops Y/ith full equipment Vv^ere being added 
monthly to the Allied forces. lYhen Bulgaria collapsed in 
September a gap opened in the battle lines v/hich the 
Germans were unable to fill. The'future appeared hopeless. 
German sued for peace. 

C. Comparative Military Manpower, V/orld v/ar II . 

For the German manpo\7er situation of 1918, 1943 
offers a deadly parallel, broken only bj” the fact that this 
time no enemy’s collapse has provided a temporarjr reversal 
of the trend. 

In the autumn of 1942, German forces (armjr plus air 
force) totalled some 8 million of her ovm forces, plus 









V-6 


SECRET 

perhaps 3 to 3.5 niiliion Italian and. .ujllite troops. The 
efierctive military strength of these forces was qualii'ied 
by the fact that large numbers must police occupied areas 
and combat large-scale guerilla activity. Opposed were 
some 19 million Russians, British, and American, 15 million 
of them in or at the shores of Europe. If we omit Russian 
home guard troops, these figures should be reduced by two 
million. On the main battlefront, Gj-milllon Russian com¬ 
bat troops opposed German armies over 25 percent weaker. 

Between 1942 and 1943, Russia has been able to 
replace her casualties, and can continue to do so. American 
strength, aside from the Navy, has grown to over 7 .nilllon, 
with ample reserves available if she 'M/ishes to call them up. 
Total United Nations strength in or at the border of Europe 
has gro\;n b^^ the number of. United States troops transported 
to that area. 

heanwhilo Italy’s defection has reduced European 
Axis strength to not over 10 million. Of the 8 millopn 
German troops, slightly older and less efficient than the 
8 Liillion of 1942, 4.5 million arc of combat ages (18-34). 

Not more than 4 million troops now face the Russians. 

German^’ has accuiaulatcd her total military capital; she 
has'no source of men but the youthful classes just reaching 
military ago. They do not exceed the number of men of the 
armed forces reaching age 35. Thus gross. c^;sualties are 
also net losses. Either the combat army is declining in 
size, or, through dilution with older men, it is'deteriorating 



SECRET 


V- V 


in quality, v/hile the strength of Gerraany’s opponents in 
I'lien and anas is Increasing. The net German monthly loss 
in the age group 18-34 is estimated at 150,000. Whatever 
the range of error in this estimate, the rate of net loss 
is considerable. It is being inflicted by attrition on the 
Russian front. Any added attrition uhich may occur through 
Anglo-American ashore in ’v/sstern and southern Europe, v/ill 
hasten the rate of German decline. 





VI-1 


rp 

J. 


VI. COI'iCLUSlON 


In t'v/o v;aya the German po ait ion aurveyed in the 
preceding pagea la better in 1943, relative to 1942, than 
it v/aa in 1913, relative to 1917. In 1910, civilian 
atandarda of living had become aerioual^/ impaired. Ihey 
had markedly deteriorated aince 1917. halnutrition and 
InadcquacjT- of clothing and fuel had not yet reduced 'cav 
production; but theae conditiona may have impaii’ed .the 
”will to fight’"'. In 1943, on the other hand, civilian 
aupplics arc v/cll maintained. In 1918, ahortagea of oil 
and of rubber affected German military activity; in 1943, 
supplica arc more adequate. 

In other 'ir.js the change in Germany’s position fro: 
1942 to 1943, I'elative to that of her opponents, ia less 
favorable than that from'1917 to 1918. f'he rate at v;hich 
the margin of advantage in \/ar output ia v/idcning in favor 
of Germany’s enemies is gi-eatcr nov; than it mas in 1913. 

The level of Germany’s relative strength in military’ nan- 
po\/er la no'/ lov/er than in 1918, c.nd the rate of decline 
in her relative sti-cngth is at least as great. 

The comparison \;ould not be complete i/ithout 

noting other factors. In 1913, the opposing forces mere, 

fully engaged on European soil. no:, british and American 

in 

forces have no foothold u'lth/the inner fortress of Europe, 
file limitations of sea communications and transport prevent 
full exerciae of the leverage of superior strength, until 







VI-2 


SECRET 

a broad foothold is established. The borders of the fortress 
ai‘e \/ell fortified, and Geriiany is still vrell equipped with 
fighter aircraft and other weapons -.‘ith \.liich to oppose in¬ 
vasion, During the coning season of bad bombing weather, 
her fighter strength naj increase. The battle-line in 
Russia is still so located as to make further retreat 
militarily feasible. Germany might still be able to ieduce 
her strength in the East, and to save the remaining forces 
by retreat while meeting invasion forces at the coastline 
with all available reserves. 

The United Rations possess a nc\! \:capon not yet 
matured in 1918, v:ith wlilch bo attack from, the air the 
industrial base of German war activityi but the united 
Nations have not yet critically weakened that base. 


It is not the function of this pap^r to prophesy. 


or 

to esti 

mate the 

res 

lilts in 1943 of this 

or ths 

:t cours 

of 

Lection 

possible 

in 

prospect or in rctros 

pcct, 

It is 

pos 

sible. 

hov7ever, 

to 

soiy Gha t n•.o in 

xt, lo , 

German 


industrial output and prcduction of munitions arc rdequate 
foi' the size of the total ;;s.r eflort she can exert; tha^t her 


maximum war effort is 

0 ve rma t die d by 

that cf h 

.cr 0 

pponents; 

and that, unless the 

Allies postpone 

invasion 

for 

a pro- 

longed future period 

in favor of air 

bombard me 

nu, ■ 

fallure 


of replacements for the German arsiy in the face of gr^^atly 
superior enemy material and numbers w’ill again be the 
immiediate condition of breakdow'n. 






J 


I 




















'' ' -v-%; *' ■‘^'* -. " f •' \ 

-ys ::•' ==■.- • _■ 




;Vi 
, .^^■■ ^‘■ 


, ^ . 


'>'S i 






- ' 'r- V.' 

.s> * . '>w. fr'V' 

ty^ ^ ^ 






. •■y .rv 




.1 

v-jj ,/«> 






'. •'. ..VC" 

'-V' 




.=;-!■ "vAi 




I-.v^-sv-K;- y. '; ■ ^A'.■■' ■'{?:,. 


mMmmMiMMMmm 




